Empty Zones, Empty Promises: Venezuela Should Beg the U.S. for Free-Zone Lessons

FTZ News: Venezuela’s free zones and special economic zones exist mostly on paper. The 2022 Organic Law of Special Economic Zones created a new legal framework. Decrees later named sites in La Guaira, Nueva Esparta, Paraguaná and a few other places. Older free-zone areas, such as the one on the Paraguaná peninsula, predate the law and were brought under the new rules in 2023. On paper the incentives include duty refunds, simplified procedures and some tax relief. Those benefits are not automatic. Official investment-promotion materials say they depend on the specific project, the sector, the investor’s commitments and a formal economic-activity agreement.
In practice, independent and verifiable figures on cargo, investment and jobs remain scarce. Local authorities in La Guaira reported $62 million in investment and 2,880 jobs for 2025, along with the start of three industrial projects. The Venezuelan embassy in Chile said in February 2026 that 112 tons of fishery products had been exported to Europe with coordination from the La Guaira zone. The authority for Nueva Esparta reported $10 million in investment and several operating projects in January 2026. These numbers come from government or local officials. They have not been confirmed by independent trade or investment data. Customs statistics published by Colombia’s DIAN, Brazil’s Comex Stat and similar official trade portals of neighboring countries list almost no Venezuelan shipments identified as originating from free zones or special economic zones. The absence of those entries does not prove zero exports; routing through third countries or ordinary customs procedures can hide the zone origin.
The older free-zone areas once handled some retail and light activity. Most of that faded after repeated currency controls, expropriations and the collapse of basic services. Newer special economic zones have signed a handful of non-binding memoranda. Sanctions, capital controls and past expropriations are cited in the U.S. State Department’s Investment Climate Statements and in public comments by firms that have declined to enter or expand in Venezuela as reasons they have not committed capital. Power cuts, port delays and road conditions are repeatedly noted by operators and logistics assessments as additional barriers once a firm is inside the country.
Any future economic recovery that aims to rebuild non-oil production will have to treat these sites as working infrastructure rather than legal text. That means clearing the backlog of old rules that still apply inside the zones, restoring reliable electricity and port access, and writing a short, fixed list of tax and customs treatments that do not change with each new decree. Companies that once used free zones in Colombia, Uruguay or the Dominican Republic will not move equipment until they can see both the physical conditions and a rule that lasts longer than a single government announcement.
The existing legal skeleton is usable as a starting point. The 2022 law already contemplates duty relief and administrative simplification. What it has not delivered is consistent execution or independently verified results at scale. Turning the named zones into places that actually clear containers, host factories and generate export paperwork would require ordinary management more than new legislation. Until that happens, the zones will continue to add little to national output.
Venezuelan authorities could also request technical material on U.S. foreign-trade zone administration—customs procedures, inventory controls, and the practical difference between a zone that clears cargo and one that exists only on paper. Whether any of that material is shared, and whether it changes operations on the ground, would still depend on the political relationship and on the same infrastructure and property-risk problems the zones already face./.
