Exclusive: Elena Panaritis on Piraeus, Rotterdam and Why Greek Free Zones Can’t Bypass U.S. Tariffs

Greek aluminium exports to the US actually rose 27.5%, to €125.7 million. Food exporters such as olives and feta feel the 15% rate more / Photo: FTZ News
FTZ News: Elena Panaritis has spent more than two decades moving between the World Bank, Greek politics and private advisory work on property rights and institutional reform. A former member of the Greek Parliament with PASOK and a senior economist at the World Bank, she has focused on how legal and administrative systems either unlock or block investment. In this interview she addresses why Greece has not built a large network of special economic zones, whether its existing customs free zones deliver real industrial value, and how the country should respond to U.S. tariffs and competition from other Mediterranean ports. She argues that Greece’s priority should be fixing national permitting and land-use systems rather than creating isolated tax zones.
1. Why has Greece not developed special economic zones like Poland, Turkey or the UAE to attract industrial investment? Is it a lack of vision or deeper structural problems?
I would frame the question differently. Greece has a clear investment-promotion vision and has built one of the more attractive foreign-investment environments in the region. Economic zones are not only a national decision. Any tax or financial incentive must comply with EU stateaid rules, and the European Commission has struck down zones that did not, as it did with Madeira’s. That framework shapes what any member state can offer.
2. Are Greece’s Free Zones Delivering Real Economic Value?
Greece is a developed economy, and we constantly simplify and improve our investment regulations. It is easy to establish an investment in Greece. Free zones are usually the tool of countries that want to focus on one specific industry, need a separate regulatory regime, or have traditionally struggled to attract investment. Our four customs free zones, at Piraeus, Thessaloniki, Heraklion and Astakos, serve trade and logistics. Thessaloniki also hosts small-scale assembly. Our growth strategy, however, is national, not zonal.
3. Are Greece’s Biggest Obstacles Economic Incentives or Governance?
This was my point in the earlier question. In Greece we are focusing on more secure and less bureaucratic governance, so that investment can flourish and new ideas, including start-ups, can develop. The goal is to make the entire country a space of growth and innovation. Even Poland, the EU’s best-known zone country, ran special economic zones from 1994 and then in 2018 extended its zone incentives to the whole national territory. Isolated zones do not serve that holistic approach.
4. What Do Trump’s Tariffs Mean for the Greek Economy?
Greece is affected by the general EU tariff framework, but our exposure is limited. Exports to the US were about €2.4 billion in 2024, or 4.8% of total Greek exports. The sectors hit hardest are aluminium and steel, which still face 50% duties. Those companies are coping because they operate internationally. In the first half of 2026, Greek aluminium exports to the US actually rose 27.5%, to €125.7 million. Food exporters such as olives and feta feel the 15% rate more. The EU has also set a deadline: if US duties on steel and aluminium products are not lowered to 15% by 31 December 2026, the Commission can suspend the EU’s own tariff concessions.
5. Can Free Zones Help Offset the Impact of U.S. Tariffs?
This is far less easy than it sounds. EU free zones do allow processing, but for US tariffs, origin is decided by US Customs, which asks whether a product was “substantially transformed.” Simple assembly, repackaging or relabelling of Asian components in a Greek zone would not make a product European. Routing goods through Europe to avoid duties is treated as transshipment and invites penalties and tighter scrutiny, both for the company and for the EU as a whole. Genuine manufacturing that adds real value in Greece is a different matter, and that is the investment we want.
6. Can Greece Compete With Europe’s Other Major Ports and Economic Zones?
Piraeus does not need to become Rotterdam, which handled about 7 million TEU in the first half of 2025 alone. It needs to be the best southern gateway into Europe. Piraeus handled about 4.6 million TEU in 2025, and it has lost some 600,000 TEU in annual volume since 2023 as shipping lines avoid the Red Sea. When those routes normalize, its position as the first major EU port after Suez returns. Beyond geography and costs, Greece offers the world’s leading shipowning community and its maritime know-how, a growing role as an energy hub for Southeast Europe, and rail and road links through Thessaloniki into the Balkans. What will decide our position is not new zones around the ports but the speed and certainty of permits, land use and customs across the whole system. Investors locate where they can prove ownership, obtain approvals on time and plan with confidence.
7. If You Were Designing Greece’s Special Economic Zone Strategy, What Would You Change?
I would start with a reality check, not a map of zones. First, identify exactly where investors get stuck: which permits, titles and approvals take too long. Then fix those chains nationally, with deadlines and accountability. Second, focus on value-added activity tied to our real strengths: logistics and processing linked to the ports, energy, and data and technology services that need clean power. Third, measure additionality: new jobs, wages, exports and local suppliers that would not have existed otherwise. Every incentive should also come with a sunset clause. If a company would have invested anyway, the tax break is a cost, not a policy.
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